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NOTES
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SECTION 16(b) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Primarily as a reaction to the "Great Crash" of 1929,1 a plethora
of federal statutes2 and regulations governing the operation of the
securities markets has emerged. In passing the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,3 Congress' primary concern was to curb "corporate
insiders'" admitted practice of reaping substantial profits by trad-
ing on the basis of information not available to the investing public.
In circumscribing the permissible conduct of persons in a position
to obtain "inside information," Congress' aim was to provide all
investors with equal access to investment information. This Note
will not question the legitimacy of federal regulation of insider trad-
ing;4 rather, it will analyze critically section 16(b)5 of the Securities
1. For an excellent analysis of this period see J. GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929 (3d ed.
1972).
2. A statute of major significance in the area of securities regulation, but beyond the scope
of this Note, is the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1970).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1970).
4. This issue has created vigorous discussion in legal and economic circles. Several com-
mentators argue that regulation of insider trading has had an adverse impact on the market.
See H. MANNE & E. SOLOMON, WALL STREET IN TRANSITION (1974); H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING
AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 260 (1968). Their contention is based on the classical
economic theory that, for the market to operate efficiently, speculation and entrepreneurship
must flourish. See J. Lowu & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 5.
10 (1973); A. SMrm, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 490-
510 (E. CANNAN ed. 1966); J. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY Op ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (R. OPIE
transl. 1934). Because an insider is thought to have both a relatively elastic demand for his
company's stock and a disproportionately large influence on the price of that stock, the
"outsiders", by observing the market activities of the insiders, receive accurate signals con-
cerning the current value of their shares. Mendelson, Book Review, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 470,
483 (1969); Wu, supra at 266. Finally, some argue that equality of access and the concomitant
equality of risk is not desirable. Although to the extent that investors are risk averse (individ-
ual's total welfare increases less than proportionately to increases in potential income), risk
equalization probably increases aggregate social welfare, many investors do not have this
psychological make up. To the extent that investors are risk preferrers (individual's total
welfare increases more than proportionately to increases in potential income), therefore, the
regulation of insider trading may well tend to decrease aggregate social welfare. H. MANNE &
E. SOLOMON, supra at 50; Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading
and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REv. 1425, 1430-32 (1967).
Other commentators argue that regulation of insider trading is necessary. See Schotland,
supra; Hetherington, Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 721. By
increasing investor confidence, governmental restraints on insider trading actually may result
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in overall social benefits. J. GALBRAITH, supra note 1, at 174-75. The major premise of federal
regulation in this area is to preserve the market as an essential part of the national financial
structure by preserving the public's belief that it is a relatively safe place to receive a reason-
able return, regardless of one's employment position. To attain maximum public investment,
therefore, the market's reputation must be above suspicion. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
Moreover, several basic common law notions buttress the theoretical arguments in behalf
of federal regulation. During the period immediately preceding the Great Crash Judge Car-
dozo expressed the rigid fiduciary standard: "Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior." Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458,
464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928). Regulation of insider trading therefore can be viewed as a
natural consequence of the common law trend toward a "disclosure philosophy" of fiduciary
conduct in which insiders are "held to something stricter than the morals of the market-
place." Id.
Recently, courts have given common law agency principles renewed attention in the area
of insider trading. See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248
N.E.2d 910 (1969) (insiders held liable to employer corporation on agency principles for
difference between selling price and eventual declined market value if they had sold shares
on over-the-counter market on basis of inside information concerning prospective decrease
in corporate earnings); Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated sub nom.,
Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974) (extention of Diamond rule to tippees of insi-
ders). See also, Note, From Brophy to Diamond to Schein: Muddled Thinking, Excellent
Result, 1 J. CORP. LAw 83 (1975); Comment, Persons Transmitting or Trading on Inside
Information Obtained from a Corporate Fiduciary are Liable Under State Law to the Corpo-
ration for the Resulting Profits, 87 HAnv. L. REV. 675 (1974). If courts are unwilling to apply
federal statutes and state blue-sky laws, liability of insiders for use of inside information may
be premised on the agency principle that an insider who appropriates information for personal
gain should be required to hold all resulting profits in constructive trust for the corporation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AoENCY § 388, Comment c at 205 (1958).
These arguments demonstrate that the consequences of regulation of insider trading on
stock market performance are uncertain, primarily because of difficulties in quantification.
Given the public's moral bias against insider trading, however, any further inquiry into the
economic rationality of the underlying premise of regulation has only academic value. This
Note, therefore, assumes (as Congress has) that the social costs of unfettered insider trading
are greater than the resulting benefits.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970) provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his
relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale,
or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an
exempted security) within any period of less than six months, unless such secu-
rity was acquired in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted,
shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on
the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such trans-
action of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold
for a period exceeding six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted
at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by
the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if
the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request
or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall
be brought more than two years after the date such profit was realized. This
subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial
owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and
purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the
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Exchange Act of 1934, one of the means designed by Congress to
effectuate its regulatory goals.'
THE "BLACK LErER RUBRIC" OF THE OBJECTIVE APPROACH
Not designed to deter all abuses of insider status, section 16(b) is
applicable only to a limited class of statutorily defined insiders7 who
are deemed most likely to speculate on the basis of inside informa-
tion. Congress concluded that the greatest opportunity for insider
speculation exists in the so-called "short-swing" transaction, in
which it can be presumed justifiably that the insider's intent is to
gain short-term profits rather than long term investments. Section
16(b) provides that any profits realized by an officer,' director,9 or
beneficial owner'0 of more than ten percent of any class of equity
Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within
the purpose of this subsection.
6. Besides section 16(b), other means Congress chose to achieve equality of access to
information include the registration requirements for certain secondary distributions, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77b(11), 77d(1), 77e (1970), the general anti-fraud provision of the Securities Act,
15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970), and the catch-all anti-fraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act,
section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
7. Section 16(b) "insiders" are defined in section 16(a) of the Act to include
"[elvery. ..beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of any class of any equity security
(other than an exempted security) which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title, or
who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
8. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (1976) wherein "officer" is defined as "a president, vice-
president, treasurer, secretary, comptroller, and any other person who performs for an issuer,
whether incorporated or unincorporated, functions corresponding to those performed by the
foregoing officers." See, e.g., Lee National Corp. v. Segur, 281 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. Pa. 1968)
(officer of wholly owned subsidiary held not to be officer of parent issuer); Lockheed Aircraft
Corp. v. Rathman, 106 F. Supp. 810 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (assistant treasurer held not to be an
"officer" within the meaning of section 16(b)).
9. The definition of "director" has created controversy by way of the so-called
"deputization" theory under which insider status is imputed to an entity whose insider is also
an insider of the issuing corporation. See, e.g., Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Feder
v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969) ("deputization" theory applied to allow
recovery, under 16(b), from corporation whose officer sat on the Board of Directors of the
issuer). The American Law Institute's proposed codification of the federal securities laws
would expressly overrule this "deputization" theory by providing that the term, "director",
does not include a person who deputizes another. See ALI FEDERAL SECURMEs CODE § 1413,
Comment 4 at 133-34 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
10. "Beneficial ownership" is not expressly defined in the Act, but the SEC has promul-
gated rules that clarify the term. See, e.g., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7793, 3
FED. SEC. L. lEP. (CCH) 26,031-32 (Jan. 19, 1966) ("beneficial ownership" includes securi-
ties held in name of spouse and minor child). Compare Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 523 F.2d
680 (2d Cir. 1975) (director found to be beneficial owner of wife's shares even though she
managed her own affairs), with, Blau v. Potter, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) $ 94,115 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (officer-director found not beneficial owner of wife's shares).
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securities," by virtue of a purchase followed by a sale or a sale
followed by a purchase within any six month period, shall be dis-
gorged to the issuing corporation. Effective enforcement of the sec-
tion depends upon the filing requirements of section 16(a)'" and the
proxy requirements of section 14.'1 Application of the section is re-
stricted to corporations having assets of more than one million dol-
lars, and a class of equity securities held by at least five hundred
people.'" The issuing corporation is the beneficiary of section 16(b).
Should it fail either to sue within sixty days after requested to sue,
or to prosecute diligently, any security holder of the issuer may sue
in a quasi-derivative posture. 5
Section 16(b) was intended to be a simple, predictable rule"
which, by efficiently curbing conspicuous abuses of insider status,
See generally Feldman & Teberg, Beneficial Ownership Under Section 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 17 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1054 (1966).
11. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (1970) which defines "equity security" as:
any stock or similar security; or any security convertible, with or without consid-
eration, into such a security, or carrying any warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase such a security; or any such warrant or right; or any other security
which the Commission shall deem to be of a similar nature and consider neces-
sary and appropriate, by such rules and regulations as it may prescribe in the
public interest or for the protection of investors, to treat as an equity security.
The Commission has adopted a regulation that further elaborates on the meaning of "equity
security" for purposes of section 16. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a11-1 (1976).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970). These reports are available at the SEC and at the exchanges.
Also the SEC publishes monthly the OFFICIAL SUMMARY OF SECURITY TRANSACTIONS AND
HOLDINGS. In 1972, the SEC amended the filing form to require disclosure of the price at which
securities were bought and sold. SEC Securities Exchange Release No. 9500 (Feb. 23, 1972).
See generally Meeker & Cooney, The Problem of Definition in Determining Insider Liabilities
Under Section 16(b), 45 VA. L. REv. 949 (1959).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1970).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). See Blau v. Lamb, 314 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1963). See also
Comment, Insider Trading: The Issuer's Disposition of an Alleged 16(b) Violation, 1968 DUKE
L.J. 94. Technically the shareholder suit under section 16(b) is not derivative in nature, and
there is no requirement that the shareholder allege ownership at the time the alleged violation
occurred, nor comply with any other requirement under FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. See R. JENNINGS
& H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 1247 (3d ed. 1972). Allegations of
champerty are the frequent result of this liberal rule of standing. See notes 98-102 infra &
accompanying text. Even though section 16(b) is silent on the subject of attorney fees, courts
have been liberal in allowing such awards to provide motivation for maximum private en-
forcement. See, e.g., Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Lewis v. Wells, 325 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See generally Kapp & Olson, Recovering
Attorneys' Fees in Short-Swing Trading Cases, 2 SEC. REo. L.J. 214, 223 (1974).
16. The chief proponent of section 16(b), Thomas B. Corcoran, referred to it as "the crude
rule of thumb" because of its literal application and its ease of administration. See Hearings
on S.97 Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 15,
at 6557 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S.971.
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would tend to equalize the informational positions of all investors. 17
By choosing a "bright line" rule of liability,' the drafters of sebtion
16(b) rejected the necessity of showing actual use of inside informa-
tion, in favor of a highly formalistic approach aimed at promoting
the statute's in terrorem value." If the defendant's conduct falls
within the various "compartments" of the section, liability is auto-
matic. The irrelevance of culpability substantially eases the plain-
tiff's evidentiary burden:
You hold [the insider liable], irrespective of any intention or
expectation to sell the security within six months after, because
it will be absolutely impossible to prove the existence of such
intention of expectation, and you have to have this crude rule of
thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having to
prove that the [insider] intended, at the time he bought, to get
out on a short swing.2
In examining section 16(b), a basic policy question is why should
its reach be limited to purchases and sales occurring within a six
17. See S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934):
Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings.., was the flagrant
betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and officers of corporations who
used their positions of trust and the confidential information which came to
them in such positions, to aid them in their market activities. Closely allied to
this type of abuse was the unscrupulous employment of inside information by
large stockholders.
Id. A notorious example is one pooling arrangement in which some 1.5 million shares of RCA
were bought and sold, during a seven day period in 1929, for a net profit of $5 million. Id. at
32-33.
18. See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 610 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Hearings on S.97, supra note 16, at 6558, in which Thomas
Corcoran states: "You have to have a general rule. In particular transactions it might work a
hardship, but these transactions that are a hardship represent the sacrifice to the necessity
of having a general rule."
19. See Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970):
The objective standard of Section 16(b) imposes strict liability upon substan-
tially all transactions occurring within the statutory time period, regardless of
. . . intent . . . or the existence of actual speculation. This approach maxi-
mized the ability of the rule to eradicate speculative abuses by reducing diffi-
culties in proof.
Id. at 696. Such an interpretation appears contradictory in light of the section's preamble,
which expresses the goal of preventing the unfair use of inside information. One court has
suggested, however, that the preamble was supplied merely to buttress the statute against
any possible constitutional attack, as well as to serve as a guide in the delegation of rulemak-
ing authority to the SEC. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
20. Hearings on S.97, supra note 16, at 6557.
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month period.2' Perhaps, as one commentator suggests, "the desire
was simply to have some relatively short period during which trad-
ing by insiders was to be suspended." 2 Temporal proximity is char-
acteristic of short-swing speculation; therefore, the six-month limi-
tation serves as an arbitrary indicator of the probable motives of
insiders. The choice of six months is the product, not of any empiri-
cal evidence, but of the investing public's general belief that there
should be a dividing line so that the regulation of short swing specu-
lation will not interfere with long-term investment activities nor
with investment liquidity."
Perhaps the most controversial element of liability under section
16(b) is the method used to compute the profits to be recaptured
by the issuing corporation. The statute is silent on the subject; the
SEC has chosen not to issue rules on computation of profits. In 1943,
however, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Smolowe
v. Delendo Corp.,24 enunciated the method that has been generally
accepted. As the defendants failed to suggest any "reasonable rule,"
the court developed the unique process of matching the lowest
priced purchases against the highest priced sales (lowest in-highest
out, or LIHO) within the six month period.2 The LIHO rule has
since been viewed as the optimal method of attaining the statute's
crude purpose, that is, "to squeeze all possible profits out of stock
transactions."26 In many cases, however, the liabilities imposed ex-
ceed the insider's actual profits and as such are punitive.27
The "objective approach," that is, a mechanistic application of
the statute in which both the existence of inside information and the
existence of scienter are irrelevant, often has resulted in harsh and
21. See Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 132 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), rev'd on
other grounds, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956). See generally
Comment, Section 16(b): An Alternative Approach to the Six-Month Limitation Period, 20
U.C.L.A. L. RE'. 1289 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Alternative Approach].
22. Alternative Approach, supra note 21, at 1294.
23. See Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co. 404 U.S. 418, 442 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Also, implicit in the six month rule is the realization that the value of the inside
information presumed to have been used will dissipate over time. Considering the insider's
stake in the corporation, as well as the obvious tax incentives, the logical inference is that a
turnover of securities within six months is motivated by the use of inside information. See
I.R.C. §§ 61, 1201, 1202, 1221.
24. 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
25. Id. at 239. See also Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969).
26. 136 F.2d at 239.
27. Compare Commissioner v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 217 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 982 (1955), with Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959). For example,
assume the following set of transactions by an insider:
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even absurd decisions. In Volk v. Zlotoff, 25 the court forced certain
officers and directors to disgorge profits even though their intent
clearly was to benefit the issuing corporation, by helping it obtain
short-term working capital through the exercise of stock options.
Conversely, the Supreme Court has noted that one who possesses
fraudulent intent, but consciously structures his transactions to
avoid liability, does not fall within the ambit of the section." Thus,
Jan. 1 buys 10 sh @ $100
Feb. 1 buys 5 sh @ $105
March 1 sells 15 sh @ $110
April 1 buys 10 sh @ $140
June 1 sells 10 sh @ $150
On the face of these transactions, the insider has fallen within the ambit of section 16(b),
and, thus, he must disgorge his profits to the corporation. The question is bow much must
be disgorge. At first glance, it appears that he has realized a gain of $225. However, using
the "lowest in-highest out" (LIHO) approach, as in Smolowe, which ignores transactions that
yield net losses, the insider must disgorge $525. For a shocking case, see Gratz v. Claughton,
187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951) (insider had an actual loss of $300,000,
but was required, pursuant to § 16 (b), to disgorge $300,000 to the issuing corporation under
the LIHO method). See also Lewis v. Wells, 325 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). At best, such
a method has resulted in increased employment for attorneys, accountants and bureaucrats.
One commentator has asserted that "the SEC has gotten so fascinated with the algebraic
formulae which a fertile mind can conceive under Section 16(b) that it has never walked away
a hundred paces and taken a good look at the monstrosity which has been created." Calder-
wood, Section 16(b)-Another Noble Experiment Gone Wrong (address before Am. Soc. of
Corp. Secretaries, New York, Apr. 21, 1960) at 32, quoted in 2 L. Loss, S-CURrTIEs REGULATION
1088 n.212 (2d ed. 1961). Ironically, in 1961, the president of the New York Stock Exchange,
overlooking that the section is in fact punitive, contended that Congress should put some
teeth into section 16(b) "so that if some insiders do take short-term profits they have to pay
some kind of penalty instead of just paying the profits back." Hearings on H.J. Res. 438
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 120 (1961).
Moreover, several requests have been made to the SEC for a rule that would define "profits
realized" as "not exceeding the maximum net profit shown by the defendant on his total
trading" during the pertinent six month period. In 1964 and 1967, for example, the Committee
on Securities Regulation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York made such
requests. D. RATNER, SECunrrIEs REGULATION 344 (1975).
28. 285 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965) (ten percent owner purchased shares to contribute
to stock bonus trust fund but within six months after contribution was made sold shares
under antitrust consent order and, thus, fell within ambit of § 16(b)).
29. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972), in which the court noted:
Liability cannot be imposed simply because the investor structured his transac-
tion with the intent of avoiding liability under § 16(b). The question is, rather,
whether the method used to "avoid" liability is one permitted by the statute.
Id. at 422. See generally Comment, Short-Swing Speculation by Corporate Insiders: Widen-
ing the Loopholes in Section 16(b), 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 412 (1973).
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according to one commentator, "equitable factors have no place in
a statute intended to be 'inequitable' on occasion in order to attain
what is felt to be a greater good: a stable, fair market in which the
public can invest with confidence."30
Both the extensive legislative history of section 16(b), and the
majority of court decisions substantiate the view that the statute is
to be applied literally and objectively.3' At least during the two
decades following the enactment of the section, the transactions
subject to the section were relatively simple, seldom extending be-
yond the range of transactions contemplated by the drafters. During
the last twenty years, however, a variety of sophisticated schemes
of business organization and employee compensation has emerged,
testing the limits of the objective approach. Not surprisingly, the
ease in enforcing this "prophylactic rule" 3 has made it "the most
cordially disliked provision" of the regulatory scheme;3 the arbi-
trariness in applying it has provoked one judge to describe it as "an
extremely crude rule of a most deformed and misshapen thumb."-"
Exemplary of the objective approach is Smolowe v. Delendo
Corp."' involving a simple cash transaction3 -the type of transac-
tion originally contemplated by Congress.37 The defendants, two
officer-directors, were sued by a minority shareholder who had con-
ceded the defendants' good faith. The court, however, in broad
terms rejected the defenses of good faith and ignorance of the law,
concluding that subjective standards of proof requiring a showing
30. Comment, Non-Cash Exchange Pursuant to a Defensive Merger Held Not a Purchase
or Sale under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353,
368 (1974). See Walet v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 202 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 820 (1953).
31. See Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 CORNELL
L. REV. 45 (1968), in which the writer notes:
[Ilt [has] made little difference whether or not the defendant in question had
actually used inside information to his own advantage. Moreover, it was seldom
asked whether or not the transaction in question could possibly lend itself to the
type of speculative activity that the statute was designed to prevent.
Id. at 47.
32. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 413 (1961).
33. 2 L. Loss, SEcunmEs REGULATION 1087 (2d ed. 1961).
34. Schnacke, J., in Provident Sec. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 787,792
(N.D. Cal. 1971).
35. 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). See note 24 supra & accompa-
nying text.
36. Cash transactions present few problems today unless a collateral issue is involved. See,
e.g., Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967).
37. See Note, Reliance Electric and 16(b) Litigation: A Return to the Objective Approach?,
58 VA. L. REv. 907, 907 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Objective Approach].
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of actual unfair use of inside information would render the statute
little more of a deterrent than are the common law rules of liabil-
ity.u
Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.,3" a 1972 Supreme
Court decision, demonstrates the impact of these early enuncia-
tions. An overt attempt by a ten percent beneficial owner to circum-
vent the statutory purpose of section 16(b) produced the contro-
versy. The respondent, Emerson Electric Co., which owned 13.2%
of the petitioner's stock as a result of an unsuccessful tender offer,
disposed of its entire holdings in two sales, both of which were
within six months of the purchase. The first sale reduced the re-
spondent's holdings to 9.96%, the second disposed of the balance.
The dispute concerned the proper treatment under section 16(b) of
the profits realized from the second transaction. Unlike an officer
or director, a ten percent beneficial owner is subject to section 16(b)
liability only when he occupied this status "both at the time of
purchase and sale or sale and purchase of the security involved."10
The district court applied an expansive reading to the phrase,
"time of sale," concluding that to comport with reality rather than
appearances, the phrase should encompass the whole period during
which a series of related transactions take place pursuant to a plan
by which a ten percent beneficial owner disposes of his stock hold-
ings.41 Although apparently conceding that the "split-sale" was in-
consistent with the spirit of the statute, the Supreme Court rejected
the district court's analysis, holding that the profits realized from
the second step were immune from section 16(b). The Court con-
cluded that amendment of the statute is the only way to both pre-
vent such acts, and, at the same time, avoid the necessity of a
"judicial search for the will-o'-the-wisp of an investor's 'intent' in
each litigated case." 2 As Reliance Electric shows, a formalistic rule
of liability, though possessing the virtue of predictability, allows its
basic purpose to be easily circumvented. The split sale device is but
a logical adaptation to the objective approach.43 Thus, the conse-
38. See 136 F.2d at 236.
39. 404 U.S. 418 (1972). See also Comment, Short-Swing Speculation by Corporate Insi.
ders: Widening the Loopholes in Section 16(b), 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 412 (1973).
40. See note 5 supra.
41. Emerson Elec. Co. v. Reliance Elec. Co., 306 F. Supp. 588, 592 (E.D. Mo. 1969).
42. 404 U.S. at 425.
43. See ALI FED. SECURITIES CODE § 1413(d), Comment 6 at 134-35 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1973) which provides that while the codification would reject it, Reliance Electric was decided
correctly, given the present state of the law. See also N. LEECH, FouRTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
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quence of applying such a device is a convenient loophole for a
culpable shareholder to bail out with partial immunity.4'
The Supreme Court recently continued this strict approach in
Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co.'" Foremost-
McKesson concerned the other end of the focal period, that is, "at
the time of the purchase." The respondent, Provident Securities
Co., had become a ten percent owner in Foremost-McKesson, Inc.
by purchasing certain convertible debentures. Within six months of
the purchase, it sold $25 million of the Foremost-McKesson deben-
tures. The overriding issue was whether "at the time of purchase"
means "prior to" or "simultaneous with." Although prior case law,
as developed in the lower courts, favored the latter interpretation,"
the Supreme Court concluded that for there to be liability beneficial
ownership was required before the purchase. 4
Unlike prior Supreme Court decisions concerning section 16(b),11
this was a unanimous decision. Foremost-McKesson seems to com-
port more closely with the statute's purpose than Reliance Electric;
because the purchaser in Foremost-McKesson was an "outsider" at
the time of the purchase, no inside information could have been
SECURITIES REGULATION 386-90 (R. MUNDHEIM, A. FLEISCHER & J. SCHUPPER ed. 1973) wherein
it is stated that the "Court [in Reliance Electric] was unable to arrive at any other interpre-
tation in the face of almost compelling statutory language and with no satisfactory legislative
history to undercut the words." Id. at 386.
44. As an alternative, Justice Douglas, viewing the majority's interpretation as the demise
of the "thorough-going qualities" of the statute, would create a rebuttable presumption that
any split-sale is part of a single plan. 404 U.S. at 436-38 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
45. 96 S. Ct. 508 (1976).
46. See, e.g., Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1970); Stella v.
Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956). See
also Note, Insider Liability for Short-Swing Profits: The Substance and Function of the
Pragmatic Approach, 72 MICH. L. REv. 592 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Pragmatic Approach]
where the commentator describes the consequences of the "prior to" interpretation:
[A] shareholder with over ten per cent could gain advance information about
a price rise. Acting upon this information, he could sell out to below ten per cent
and shortly thereafter repurchase even more shares than he originally held. This
sale and purchase, though covered by section 16(b), would likely be inconse-
quential, since the price of the stock would not yet have risen. It would rise
shortly thereafter, but the investor could sell and take his profits with impunity
if the repurchase were exempt under section 16(b) ....
Id. at 600 n.34. The proposed codification of the federal securities laws would incorporate the
"simultaneous with" interpretation. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1413(d) at 129 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1973).
47. 96 S. Ct. at 518-19.
48. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Co., 411 U.S. 582 (1973) (Douglas,
Brennan & Stewart, J.J., dissenting); Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418
(1972) (Douglas, Brennan & White, J.J., dissenting).
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obtained "by reason of his relationship to the issuer."49 Apparently,
Congress felt that to provide this loophole was more equitable than
"to suck into a suffocating dragnet many who ... could not justly
be so held."' " Perhaps because of the conclusive presumption in-
cluded in the statute, a strict view of its applicability is appropriate.
Moreover, the Court in Foremost-McKesson noted the increasing
use of other, more suitable, methods of combatting the problem of
insider trading. For example, rule 10b-5, 11 which has become a
major obstacle to insider speculation, is a remedy without the limi-
tations of section 16(b). That rule 10b-5 would fill any void resulting
from a narrow reading of section 16(b), undercuts substantially the
logic of the argument in favor of an expansive reading of the section.
THE PRAGMATIC APPROACH: DECREASING THE INSIDER'S RISK
Because the courts now apply section 16(b) to transactions not
originally envisioned by Congress, the number of approaches used
by the federal courts has expanded. Although courts apply the stat-
ute literally to a cash transaction, 2 when confronted with an
"unorthodox" transaction,53 the same courts have sought to mitigate
the "purposeless harshness"54 of the objective approach by applying
a "pragmatic approach."
Under the pragmatic approach, the courts deny the existence of
any "black letter rubric"" in section 16(b) jurisprudence, requiring
instead a threshold examination of the facts in each case to deter-
mine whether there was the possibility of speculative abuse in the
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
50. Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors, Inc., 232 F.2d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 1956) (Hincks, J.,
dissenting). Prior to Foremost-McKesson, the "prior to" interpretation had been adopted by
only one district court. See Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. W.R. Stephens Inv. Co., 141 F. Supp.
841 (W.D. Ark. 1956). See also Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971) (Congress intended a narrow construction of the section so as not
to discourage long-term investment).
51. See notes 125-84 infra & accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971) in which
Judge Friendly asserted that in the case of "orthodox" translation, "it would be no defense
that a person . . .was operating, by sheer intuition, from Antarctica or even from outer
space." Schur v. Salzman, 365 F. Supp. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Id. at 162.
53. See 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1069 (2d ed. 1961). The term is applied to stock
conversions, mergers, reclassifications and reorganizations. See generally Lang & Katz,
Section 16(b) and "Extraordinary" Transactions: Corporate Reorganizations and Stock
Options, 49 NOTRE DAME L. Rav. 705 (1974).
54. Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 519 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
55. Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82, 85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954).
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transaction." If the conclusion is negative, the transaction is
deemed not to fall within the purview of the statute. 7 The concept
seems laudable in that the substance of the transaction is at least
considered. The pragmatic approach, however, appears incompati-
ble with the objective approach. Moreover, it seems redundant in
light of the recent expansive readings of rule 10b-5, in which the
substance of the transaction also is considered. 8 In 1973, however,
the Supreme Court endorsed the pragmatic approach in Kern
County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.," a decision incon-
sistent with Reliance Electric and Foremost-McKesson.
In Kern County, Occidental Petroleum had acquired, by a statu-
tory "purchase," shares of Kern in an attempted tender offer. The
plan was spoiled by a subsequent defensive merger between Kern
and Tenneco, Inc. which locked Occidental in as a minority share-
holder of Kern, thus forcing it to exchange the Kern securities for
those of Tenneco10 Tenneco's receipt, to its benefit, of an option to
repurchase its shares from Occidental complicated the situation.
Affirming the decision of the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court
held that "neither the option nor the exchange constituted a 'sale'
within the purview of section 16(b)." 6' After scrutinizing the facts,
the Court rejected the contention that Occidental knew that it could
sell its stock to the merger partner at a profit if the tender offer
failed. Instead, the Court chose to emphasize the involuntary nature
of the transaction to support its finding that no opportunity for
speculative abuse of inside information existed." Unquestionably,
56. See, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
See generally Wentz, Refining a Crude Rule: The Pragmatic Approach to Section 16(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 221 (1975). The commentators are in
conflict as to the legitimacy of such an ad hoc approach. Compare Lowenfels, note 31 supra
(finding support for pragmatic approach in both statutory language and legislative history),
with, Comment, Non-Cash Exchange Pursuant to a Defensiue Merger Held Not a Purchase
or Sale Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 353,
354 (1974) (pragmatic approach "may have laid the foundation for. . . eventual demise of
.. . provision").
57. "Cessante ratione legis, cessat it ipsa lex" or, "When the reason for the law ceases, the
law itself must also cease."
58. See notes 125-84 infra & accompanying text.
59. 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
60. See Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971).
61. 411 U.S. at 590-91.
62. The court, applying the pragmatic approach, asserted:
[I1f its takeover efforts failed, it is argued, Occidental knew it could sell its
stock ... at a substantial profit. Calculations of this sort ... do not represent
the kind of speculative abuse at which the statute is aimed, for they could not
[Vol. 18:389
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Kern County destroyed 16(b)'s predictability, for the "possibility of
abuse" test is vague enough to allow divergent conclusions from the
same facts. 3 The only certainty is that this judicially conceived
approach will increase litigation.
Gold v. Sloan64 demonstrates the effect of Kern County on subse-
quent 16(b) litigation. Atlantic Research Corporation (ARC) and
Susquehanna Corporation (SC) were merging. The defendants, who
were officers or directors as well as stockholders in ARC, received
preferred shares of SC in exchange for their holdings in ARC. On
an objective reading of the statute, all of the defendants would have
been liable because the shares were sold within six months after the
merger." The district court, however, initiated an extensive factual
have been based on inside information obtained from substantial stockholdings
that did not yet exist.
Id. at 597-98. See also American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 510 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 2397 (1975) (no section 16(b) liability found in a case in which the
tender offeror, unlike Occidental, continued to fight control and to prevent defensive merger
because of no "possibility of abuse").
63. The Court's decision in Kern County was not unanimous. Justice Douglas, who argued
for an expansive approach on similar facts in Reliance Electric, see 404 U.S. at 427-42, seems
to have rejected that approach in his Kern County dissent. 411 U.S. at 605 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Douglas also noted:
The conclusion seems inescapable that Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Oc-
cidental) purchased and sold shares of Kern County Land Company (Old Kern)
within a six-month period and that this "round trip" in Old Kern Stock is
covered by the literal terms of § 16(b).
Id. Furthermore, as then Circuit Judge Blackmun, who concurred with the majority in Kern
County, had espoused:
My own reaction is that either the statute means what it literally says or that
it does not; that if the Congress intended to provide additional exceptions it
would have done so in clear language; and that the recognized purpose and aim
of the statute are more consistently and protectively to be served if the statute
is construed literally and objectively rather than non-literally and subjectively
on a case-by-case approach. The latter inevitably is a weakening process.
Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 538 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied sub nom. Blau v. Petteys,
385 U.S. 1006 (1967) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The inconsistent Supreme Court voting pattern in section 16(b) cases has caused many
lower courts to struggle for the proper standard. See, e.g., Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 386 F.
Supp. 1130, 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), af/'d, 523 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1975).
For a discussion of the lack of predictability, see 5 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3029
(Supp. 1969) in which the author states that the pragmatic cases have a "generalization
defying nature [and] . . . will continue to rule us from their graves." See also Comment,
Insiders' Liability Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act for Stock Transfer
After Corporate Merger, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rav. 149, 162 (1973).
64. 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973). See generally Note, Securities Exchange Act Section
16(b): Fourth Circuit Harvests Kernels of Gold, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 852 (1974); Note, Gold
v. Sloan: Section 16(b)'s Application to Short Swing Trading in Post-Merger Situations, 36
U. Prr. L. REV. 139 (1974).
65. 486 F.2d at 342.
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inquiry and exonerated one defendant because he was merely a
"titular officer. ' 66
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit exonerated several
other insiders as well, holding only one director liable because he
alone was involved intimately in the merger negotiations, and was
thus the only one occupying a position of potential speculative
abuse." One defendant was exonerated because he was merely an
outside director separated from the actual negotiations and as such
was as much an outside observer as was Occidental in Kern
County. 8 The court applied similar reasoning to reach the same
conclusion regarding two officers of ARC. 9 Such a factual inquiry
moves even farther away from the statutory language and intent of
16(b) than the Kern County "possibility of abuse" test. Although
in Kern County the majority rejected the test based on actual pos-
session of inside information, the court in Gold concluded that
"[tihe actual knowledge possessed by an insider at the time of a
given 'unorthodox transaction' is an essential element to be consid-
ered in determining whether a 16(b) 'purchase' has occurred .... ,70
In the courts' attempts to adapt to increasingly complex transac-
tions and to ameliorate the harshness of 16(b), the statute has been
modified beyond recognition by judicial interpretation. Given the
language of the statute, whether a director is active or inactive is
usually deemed irrelevant for purposes of establishing liability
under section 16(b).' Also, it usually is conclusively presumed that
a director is performing his job, and as such is privy to information
about his corporation that he could use to his benefit. 72 Neverthe-
less, several commentators have asserted that both the statutory
language and the legislative history support the pragmatic ap-
proach.7 3 In any event, whether or not such support in fact exists,
the trend is to apply the pragmatic approach with its reliance on
factual analysis.
66. Gold v. Scurlock, 324 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Va. 1971).
67. 486 F.2d at 351-53.
68. Id. at 346.
69. Id. at 351.
70. Id. at 352-53 (emphasis supplied).
71. See, e.g., Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 344 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S.
927 (1959).
72. See Pragmatic Approach at 613-14; Comment, Securities-Section 16(b)-Merger as
a "Purchase", 20 WAYNE L. REv. 1415 (1974).
73. See Lowenfels, supra note 31, at 57-61; W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 700 (4th ed. abr. 1970).
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ALLOCATIONAL AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF 16(B)
LIABILITY RULES
Analytical Framework
The remainder of this Note is devoted to an analytical discussion
of the consequences of applying both the objective and pragmatic
approaches to section 16(b), and to a comparison of these conse-
quences with those resulting from the imposition of liability under
rule 10b-5. Primary emphasis will be placed on the effects of the
various liability rules both on the individual insider's decision-
making behavior and on the cost of enforcement. In addition, no-
tions of distributional equity7 will be considered.
From a policy perspective, the efficient enforcement of any legal
rule depends upon many co-existing variables. The efficient appli-
cation of a statute such as section 16(b) is a function (sum) of the
amount of resources available for enforcement, the method in which
these resources are allocated, and the discounted (to the present)
values placed by the insider on the costs and benefits of violating
the rule. First, it generally is agreed that some quantity of violations
greater than zero is optimal; total detection and prevention is too
costly. Because enforcement requires the use of scarce resources, the
goal of enforcement is "to achieve that degree of compliance with
the rule of prescribed (or proscribed) behavior that the society be-
lieves it can afford."7 Thus, one objective in the area of government
regulation should be that of minimizing enforcement costs. 6
The other focal point in this analysis is from the perspective of
the insider who is contemplating speculating on inside information.
A legal rule is designed to place a cost on a violator, and, to be
efficient, that cost should be greater than the cost of imposing it.7
The inside trader's expected utility (i.e. benefit or return) from
violating the securities laws is a function of several variables. First,
there are the expected gains and losses, both monetary and
psychic. 8 Also, there is an opportunity cost to the inside trader as
74. Although the concept of distribution equity is predictably found in many discussions
of public policy, it has eluded any precise definition. See notes 85-87 infra & accompanying
text.
75. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 526 (1970). This
merely states that society will tolerate violations of a legal rule whenever the marginal return
from violations prevented has a lower value than the marginal cost incurred.
76. See generally Schwartz and Tullock, The Costs of a Legal System, 4 J. LEGAL STUDIES
75 (1975).
77. See R. POSNER, AN EcoNobc ANALYSIS OF LAW § 25.1 at 357-59 (1973).
78. See Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement, 1 J. LEGAL STUDIES
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he could be allocating his efforts to the furtherance of a legitimate
activity.
Thus, the total amount of proscribed insider activities depends
upon the mean income derived from participation in the proscribed
activity, the mean income earned from participation in the most
attractive available kind of legitimate investment, the mean proba-
bility of being detected and ultimately being found liable," and the
mean discounted (present) value of the sanction imposed." Com-
mon sense dictates that an increase in either or both of the latter
pair of variables (hereinafter referred to as the enforcement varia-
bles) will cause a decrease in the quantity of violations; the prob-
lem, however, is in determining the comparative degree of elasticity
(responsiveness to change) of the supply of violations in relation to
changes in the quantities of the enforcement variables.
To determine these quantities, the attitude toward risk of those
violating 16(b) is a crucial factor. Moreover, the absolute amount
of risk to a participant is a function of the quantity and quality of
information available to him. 8' Thus, if an inside trader is risk neu-
tral, the elasticity of the supply of violations in relation to changes
in either of the enforcement variables will be the same. 82 If he is a
259, 262 (1972). These gains are a function of the violator's time, skill and experience.
79. See Schwartz & Tullock, supra note 76 at 76. "The probability of a sanction's being
imposed ... is a function of the costs incurred in detecting violations, providing data to the
tribunal having jurisdiction, and staffing the tribunal." Id. at 77. One significant element
that would affect the probability of being held liable is the quality and quantity of legal
services available to the defendant.
80. The discounted (or present) value of the sanction is a function of the insider's rate of
discounting possible future costs. Thus, a violator of the antitrust laws, who is subject to
treble damages, need not by his actions indicate a preference for risk, but simply need
demonstrate that such a cost was subjectively deferred. See Ehrlich, supra note 78, at 267.
This issue also arises in discussions of the deterrent effects of capital punishment. A person
may commit a crime punishable by death not because he is irrational or because he is a risk
preferrer but simply because he has a high rate of discounting the future costs. Id. at 266.
81. See Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inven-
tive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. Rzv. 561 (1971); Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another
Viewpoint, 12 J. LAW & EcoN. 1 (1969).
82. A risk neutral person is solely interested in the expected value of his prospective gain.
Thus, his expected wealth and his expected utility (benefit or return) are the same. Ehrlich,
supra note 78, at 265. Insider, j, has a utility function: Uj=Uj(Yj). Assuming utility is mea-
sured in units called "Utiles" (U), a typical utility schedule for a risk neutral insider would
be:
Yj Uj
$3000 3000U
5000 5000U
10,000 10,000U
20,000U20,O000
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risk preferrer, however, the elasticity of the supply of violations will
be greater with respect to changes in the probability of being held
liable than to proportionate changes in the discounted value of the
sanction.83 Conversely, if the insider is a risk averter, the responsive-
ness of the supply of violations will be greater with respect to
changes in the discounted value of the sanction.84
The effects upon distributional equity of alternative implementa-
tion devices are of major concern. Equity, in a distributional sense,
evades precise definition. "Presumably, the term implies that
equals should .be treated equally, that unequals should be treated
unequally, and that the differences in treatment should be 'fair.' "
Basically, there are two concepts of equity; one's view of the distri-
butional effects of a given situation is dependent upon the concept
adopted. Ex ante equity is achieved when each participant is sub-
jected to equal risks and provided with equal opportunities." Ex
Assume that a policymaker wants to deter "j" from trading on inside information. He can
increase the probability of being held liable by, for example, 20%, or the discounted value of
the sanction by 20%. Assuming the cost of both alterations are equal, the optimal change will
be the one that reduces the insider's expected gain from the illegitimate activity the most.
In the case of a risk neutral person, a 20% change in either of the enforcement variables
produces a concomitant decrease in expected utility.
83. A risk preferrer is one whose total utility increases more than proportionately as ex-
pected income rises. His utility schedule would show:
Yj Uj
$3000 2000U
5000 4000U
10,000 1O,O00U
20,000 25,OOOU
30,000 40,OOOU
He is one who realizes more satisfaction from an increase in income, than suffers from an
equal decrease. Should the policymaker have to choose between a 20% increase in either of
the enforcement variables, he should opt for the former, assuming equal costs, because such
a person assigns a greater value to the gain if he wins than to the sanctions if he loses, so
that imposition of heavier losses is not going to deter as much as a like increase in the
probability of being held liable. Ehrlich, supra note 78, at 265.
84. For a risk averter, the converse of the risk preferrer model applies. In other words, a
risk averter is one who realizes less enjoyment (benefit or utility) from an increase in income
than he suffers from an equal decrease. Thus, unlike the risk preferrer, a risk averter is more
greatly deterred by an increase in the severity of the penalty, than in a proportionate increase
in the probability of being held liable.
85. Pauly & Willett, Two Concepts of Equity and Their Implications for Public Policy,
53 Soc. Sci. Q. 8, 8 (1972).
86. Id. at 9. An example of ex ante equity is a lottery before the drawing. After the drawing,
there will be one winner but many losers, thus producing ex post inequity.
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post equity is attained when each participant has received the same
benefit, and has incurred the same costs.87
Initially it is useful to consider briefly the consequences of an
approach that is seemingly consistent with the public's moral bias:
an absolute prohibition against all insider investments." Clearly
such a prohibition, coupled with strict filing requirements, would
solve most of the problems of insider trading.89 Although superfi-
cially attractive, such an approach would create several problems.
Assuming a narrow definition of "insider" as used in section 16(b),
an absolute preclusion would create both ex ante and ex post ineq-
uity. All investors would have relatively equal opportunities to in-
vest, except the members of this arbitrarily defined group. Such ex
ante inequity contributes to a concomitant ex post inequitable dis-
tribution of income.
Moreover, not only is this proposal inequitable, but also it results
in inefficiency. To allow employees to own stock in the employer
tends to maximize efficiency, in that it permits the employee to
empathize with the outside stockholders and creates an incentive
for that individual to increase his productivity. Thus, total disallow-
ance of such direct compensation would tend to lower the rate of
return of the insider's investment in human capital"0 which in the
long run could create an incentive toward more leisure time.,' For
these reasons, outside shareholders support the concept of allowing
insiders to invest in their companies . 2 Similarly, it appears Con-
87. Id. at 12. The easiest way to attain ex post equity is to tax the winners to compensate
the losers. Of course, such a process would require a tradeoff in terms of efficiency because
individual initiative would be lessened.
88. Section 16(b) does not preclude insider investments or even prevent an insider from
trading on the basis of inside information. Thus, an insider is allowed to recover his invest-
ment and required only to disgorge his "profit" to the issuer.
89. Such a scheme would not solve all of the problems associated with insider trading. For
example, it is conceivable that an insider, although not owning stock in the corporation
himself, could "tip" an outsider who would not be precluded from making such investments.
90. See generally M. BLAUo, THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION (1972).
91. The relationship of progressive income tax rates to incentives is analogous. Although
such a tax structure theoretically should provide a disincentive to increase one's income,
available empirical evidence seems to demonstrate the opposite tendency because executives
find that they must work much harder to "take home" the same income. J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL
TAX POLICY 66-67 (rev. ed. 1971).
92. See Munter, Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: An Alternative to
"Burning Down the Barn in Order to Kill the Rats", 52 CORNELL L. Q. 69, 88 (1966). See also
In re Calton Crescent, Inc., 173 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1949) in which Judge Learned Hand,
dissenting, stated: "I conceive that the law allows [an insider] to increase his stake in the
company, because it adds to his incentives to make it succeed . . . ." Id. at 952 (L. Hand,
J., dissenting).
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gress intuitively concluded that the costs in terms of disincentives
outweigh the benefits of a rule of total preclusion.
The Objective Approach
Allocational Effects
That the drafters of 16(b) intended it to serve as a potent deter-
rent to short-swing insider trading can be discerned from the sec-
tion's legislative history. Judge Clark, in Smolowe, felt his LIHO
method of damage computation was consistent with the statutory
purpose. Also Judge Learned Hand observed that 16(b)'s "crushing
liabilities . . should certainly serve as a warning, and may prove
a deterrent."9 The primary consideration, therefore, should be
whether the "crude rule of thumb" in 16(b) is as efficient as it is
harsh. 4
The implicit assumption of the drafters was that to maximize its
deterrent value, section 16(b) must be easy to administer, must
create a high probability of liability, and must have a sanction that,
while nominally remedial, is somewhat punitive. This assumption
is not irrational. Empirical evidence, however, though equivocal,
seems to demonstrate that insider trading still occurs frequently,
both on the short-swing and the long-term." This evidence leads to
the conclusion that section 16(b) is not in fact a potent obstacle.
From an enforcement standpoint, section 16(b) is largely self-
executing, thus reducing administrative costs." Under the objective
93. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
94. Even though several countries have securities laws patterned after the American
model, the harsh operation of section 16(b) is indigenous to the United States. See Munter,
supra note 92, at 70-71.
95. See Lorie & Niederhoffer, Predictive and Statistical Properties of Insider Trading, 11
J. LAW & EcoN. 35 (1968) in which the writers state that "[wihen insiders accumulate a stock
intensively, the stock can be expected to outperform the market during the next six months.
Insiders tend to buy more often than usual before larg price increases and to sell more than
usual before price decreases." Id. at 52. See also Jaffe, The Effect of Regulation Changes on
Insider Trading, 5 BELL J. EcoN. 93 (1974).
96. Still, the consequence of any legal rule is that it creates litigation. To the extent that
enforcement of section 16(b) is a public good, however, it is obviously appropriate for the
public to bear some of the burdens so as to "internalize" what would otherwise be external
benefits. See Schwartz & Tullock, supra note 76, at 81 in which the authors note:
If indeed the capacity for correct decision making purchased with fixed enforce-
ment costs is a public good of all people benefitting from compliance with the
laws then it would be inefficient to finance these exclusively through user
charges .... This notion provides justification for the present practice of not
charging the litigants for the full opportunity cost of judges and physical facili-
ties utilized in litigation.
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approach, the costs of litigation are low, as extensive factual analy-
sis is usually unnecessary. Also, the use of private enforcement,
coupled with the insider's knowledge of the liberal attorney fee
awards, tends to conserve judicial resources by promoting settle-
ments. As liability is conclusive, both parties can predict accurately
the outcome without going to court. This is not to suggest, however,
that the settlement will be for an amount less than the "normal"
measure of damages. 7
Because of the liberal standing requirements under section 16(b),
champerty has been a recurring subject of controversy." As recov-
ery goes to the issuing corporation, the benefit to an individual
shareholder of bringing a 16(b) action is likely to be insignificant;
thus, the sole stimulus to maintaining an efficient level of enforce-
ment is the prospect of large attorney fees. Champerty is a social
cost, at least in psychic terms, because it reduces the integrity of
the market. Apparently, however, Congress believes that public
benefits realized from vigorous (albeit self-interested) private en-
forcement outweigh any social costs resulting from champerty 9
Loss' has argued, and others have concurred,' that the SEC
should be substituted as the proper plaintiff in 16(b) suits. Such a
change, however, seems unnecessary. The private enforcement
mechanism has provided effective enforcement, as well as signifi-
cant deterrent value, and it is certainly "rare good fortune when
controls can be self-executing, without governmental interposi-
tion."'0 ° On balance, therefore, the objective approach tends to effi-
ciently conserve judicial and administrative resources.
From the standpoint of an insider facing section 16(b) liability,
presumably, all other things being equal, the more expected income
to be derived from the short-swing, the more likely it is that the
insider will trade. Thus, the purpose of section 16(b) is to reduce the
insider's expected return by allocating resources so that both en-
forcement variables will be used efficiently. Under the objective
approach, the probability of being detected is high because section
97. See Lewis v. Wells, 325 F. Supp. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (court rejected a settlement
equal to 82% of the profits realized by the insiders, and required full recovery by the corpora-
tion to further the purpose of the statute).
98. For conflicting views on the policy of private enforcement, compare 2 L. Loss, SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 1051-55 (2d ed. 1961), with Cary, Book Review, 75 HARV. L. REV. 857 (1962).
99. See, e.g., Magida v. Continental Can Co., 176 F. Supp. 781, 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
100. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1053-54 (2d ed. 1961).
101. See, e.g., Munter, supra note 92, at 96-99.
102. Cary, supra note 98, at 860.
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16(a) requires insiders to file information concerning any changes in
ownership of their stock, and the prices of any such transfers." 3
These disclosures are the primary source of litigation and settlement
pursuant to section 16(b). The prospect of disclosure to the
investing public should serve as a deterrent in itself, because it
provides for the "rapid communalization of rewards"'"' that would
otherwise have been realized from the short-swing trading.',"
Various evidentiary rules (presumptions and burden of proof) af-
fect the probability of being held liable under section 16(b). Because
the objective approach provides a per se rule of liability, the proba-
bility of the insider being required to disgorge his profits is high,
once detection has been made. In fact, the only question is whether
the insider falls within the statutory limitations. The narrower the
class of potential defendants, the greater the probability of holding
insiders liable. To this extent, an arbitrarily narrow rule such as
section 16(b), when literally applied, tends to produce inaccurate
conclusions concerning its efficiency. Because a rigid rule allows for
easy avoidance, the probability of holding an insider liable under
the objective approach could be much lower than it actually ap-
pears. Thus the actual effect of such an irrebuttable per se rule, is,
at best, uncertain. In addition, as noted above, even if such proba-
bilities are relatively high, the deterrent effect on insider behavior
is ultimately dependent upon that person's attitude toward risk. A
high probability of being held liable should deter risk preferrers
more efficiently than a proportionately high value of the sanction
imposed. Nevertheless, because inside traders are presumed to be
betting on a "sure thing" (characteristic of risk averters) in that
they have access to accurate information, enforcement resources are
not being optimally allocated.
An insider should know, either from the case law or by word of
mouth, that the profits subject to disgorgement under section 16(b)
are not limited to the actual profits realized during the six-month
103. See note 14 supra & accompanying text.
104. Demsetz, Perfect Competition, Regulation, and the Stock Market, in ECONOMIIC POL-
ICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 11 (H. Manne ed. 1969).
105. Such disclosure requirements are not necessarily inconsistent with the contention by
some economists that insider trading contributes to the overall efficiency of the stock market.
See generally H. MANNE, supra note 4. The proper equilibrium level for the stock will be
reached most swiftly when the investment community has access to information that will
"permit valid inferences regarding future movements in the prices of stocks." Lorie & Nieder-
hoffer, supra note 95, at 35. To the extent that this principle is correct, section 16(a) encour-
ages the process.
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period. Theoretically, increasing the discounted value of the sanc-
tion through this "quasi-punitive" liability should tend to decrease
the number of violations, especially if insiders are risk averse. From
the standpoint of deterrence maximization, the LIHO method of
damages is appropriate; if recovery were simply limited to actual
profits, no real cost would be imposed on the insider (except for
opportunity costs and possible social stigma) because he merely
would be returned to his financial status quo. Thus, the "purpose-
less harshness" of the objective approach in fact has a purpose,
but the attainment of that purpose is dependent upon the effect
that an increase in harshness has upon the number of violations.
To the extent that insiders are risk averse, such increases should
cause significant decreases in the expected benefit from trading on
the short-swing.
Theoretically, the 16(b) scheme apparently tends to be an effi-
cient deterrent.' If this is so, however, why is it that much
106. Of course, any analysis of the deterrent value of the sanction imposed under section
16(b) would be incomplete without a consideration of the tax consequences to the insider of
such disgorgements. There are four basic possible tax treatments of section 16(b) liability:
no favorable treatment, an ordinary deduction, a capital loss, and an increase in the tax basis.
Davis, Tax Treatment of Section 16(b) Payments, 27 STAN. L. REV. 143 (1974); Note, Tax
Consequences of Repayments by Insiders in Satisfaction of Section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 40 Mo. L. REV. 195 (1975). During the early 1950's, the policy supported
by the Commissioner and adopted by the Tax Court was to reject any type of favorable tax
treatment because such treatment "would frustrate the public policy expressed in (section
16(b)]." See William F. Davis, Jr., 17 T.C. 549, 556 (1951); I.T. 4069, 1952-1 CUM. BULL. 28.
Cf. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). Because section 16(b)
liability was considered a penalty, it was felt that any favorable tax treatment would frustrate
the policy of deterrence. Since 1956, however, the 16(b) payment has been deductible as "an
ordinary and necessary business expense." See Laurence M. Marks, 27 T.C. 464 (1956). In
1961, the Commissioner reversed his prior stand by concluding that:
[The] purpose [of § 16(b)] is not frustrated by the allowance of a tax deduc-
tion for amounts paid by reason of section 16(b); but, rather, the allowance of
the deduction is consistent with the purpose of the statute in returning the
insider to his original position.
Rev. Rul. 61-115, 1961-1 CUM. BULL. 46, 48. This ruling codifies, in the context of section
16(b), Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952). See also 5 L. Loss, SEcuarmEs
REGULATION 3048 (Supp. 1969). Several recent Tax Court decisions have followed this ap-
proach. See, e.g., Nathan Cummings, 61 T.C. 1 (1973); James E. Anderson, 56 T.C. 1370
(1971); William L. Mitchell, 52 T.C. 170 (1969). See generally Comment, Tax Treatment of
Section 16(b) Repayments: Tax Court Again Reversed, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 824. The circuit
courts, however, have not been receptive to such treatment, opting instead for capital loss
treatment. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
909 (1970) (holding that § 16(b) payments must be treated as a capital loss in light of
Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952), and United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S.
678 (1969)). See Davis, supra at 158 where the commentator concludes that capital loss
treatment is proper.
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litigation and many settlements still occur? The American Law
Institute has noted that "section 16(b) should afford sufficient de-
terrence to those who are aware of it ... ."101 Perhaps to a great
degree, therefore, section 16(b) is merely a trap for the unwary.' °
The foregoing discussion, for example, has assumed that insiders are
rational individuals who have access to adequate information. As
access to information decreases, however, the rationality of the insi-
der's decision-making decreases. Although uncertainty is greater
under the pragmatic approach, it has been observed that, even as
to common transactions, "few insiders consciously engage in
[inside] trading."'0 9 Rather, although quantification is impossible,
many insiders trade because of financial necessity."' Moreover, to
the extent that the enforcement variables are not known by the
insider, the optimal amount of deterrence will not be attained, ex-
cept by chance.
Any favorable tax treatment seems contrary to the true policy of section 16(b). The judicial
confusion concerning the tax consequences of 16(b) payments is simply another example of
the tendency to mitigate the harshness of the statute. Certainly, the LIHO method of comput-
ing damages appears just as inconsistent as a policy of denying favorable tax treatment with
the purported purpose of the statute to return the insider to his original position. Rev. Rul.
61-115, 1961-1 CuM. BULL. 46,48. As statutory insiders are probably in upper income brackets,
such allowances, especially an ordinary deduction, tend to mitigate any deterrent value that
the section might otherwise possess. Both opponents and proponents of ordinary deductibility
have found support in the language of § 162 which disallows such a deduction for any "fine
or similar penalty paid to a government for violation of any law." I.R.C., § 162(f). The pro-
ponents note that the legislative history states that the enumerated disallowances are all
inclusive and, thus, as profits are disgorged to a corporation, -it does not come within the
statutory language. See S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 279 (1969). For the
opposite view, see Nelson, Tax Dedictibility of Insider Profit Repayments: Resolving an
Apparent Conflict, 24 CAsE W. REs. L. REV. 330 (1973). Obviously, to the extent that insiders
are risk averse, this mitigation effect will be exacerbated because the number of offenses is
greatly responsive to changes in the discounted value of the sanction, one of the two enforce-
ment variables.
107. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1413, Comment 21 at 140 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973) (emphasis
supplied).
108. See 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, FEDERAL ScuRrrIEs AND CORPORATE LAW § 10.01(4) at 10-5
(1975); Deitz, A Practical Look at Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 43 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1 (1974).
109. Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L.
REv. 612, 615 (1953).
110. One possibility is for the insider to pledge his shares, but this solution entails problems
as well. First, a person cannot receive 100% of the fair market value for his pledged securities.
Also, there is still a chance that he will ultimately be held liable under section 16(b), if the
bank should sell the shares. See, e.g., Alloys Unlimited, Inc. v. Gilbert, 319 F. Supp. 617
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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Distributional Effects
The goal of regulation of insider trading is to promote ex ante
equality of access to investment information thus providing an
equal opportunity to every member of the investing public. Unfor-
tunately, however, inequity seems to be the consequence of section
16(b)'s arbitrarily limited application. Although the six-month rule
separates the liable from the non-liable, it does not separate the
users of inside information from the non-users."' Consequently, the
rule in effect rewards an insider for his astuteness in evading the
reach of the statute;"12 this clearly is not an acceptable public policy,
especially since the tax laws provide an incentive for him to do so
anyway. 113
There is a similar problem in the arbitrary definitions of officer,
director, and ten percent beneficial owners. The dangers of insider
manipulation are present even if all members of these groups were
completely prevented from trading, for section 16(b) exonerates a
significant number of insiders who have access to valuable informa-
tion. To illustrate, in corporations with extremely diverse owner-
ship, a five percent stockholder might be as much an insider as an
officer or director"' and as such, generally has as much access to
inside information as a ten percent owner. Yet the five percent
owner is immune to liability under 16(b).
In light of the total class of insiders (not limited to the 16(b)
definition), the objective approach fails to achieve either ex ante or
ex post equity. The objective approach exposes an arbitrarily desig-
nated group of insiders to liability, while those falling outside the
statutory limits avoid all such costs."' This ex ante inequity will
produce an ex post inequitable distribution of the benefits of having
access to inside information. Furthermore, because many defen-
111. One court has noted that "[olne can speculate on whether the moral or ethical values
are altered by the passage of 24 hours but the statute makes an honest if not honorable man
out of the insider in that period." Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959).
112. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 15, at 1031, in which the editors state that
"any moderately bright manipulator should be able in many cases to string out his activities
over a period of more than six months and thus escape any penalty under the section. He
would probably want to do that anyway for tax purposes."
113. See I.R.C. §§ 1201, 1211, & 1222.
114. Hearings on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56 & S. Res. 97, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15, at 6556
(1934).
115. This is not to say that such persons are immune to suit under rule 10b.5 or state
common law. These remedies, however, appear to be more equitable for the defendant,
though more burdensome for the plaintiff. See notes 125-84 infra & accompanying text.
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dants in section 16(b) litigation are corporations that are members
of relatively concentrated industries, the application of section
16(b) ultimately will be felt, at least in part, by the consumers of
these corporations' products,"' thus magnifying ex post inequity.
Furthermore, distributional equity (both ex ante and ex post)
should be viewed in relation to the culpability of the insiders. Non-
culpable parties have fallen victim to the blind application of sec-
tion 16(b) under both the objective and subjective approaches. Con-
sequently, inequities frequently result. Because non-culpable par-
ties are detected more easily, their ex ante risk of liability is greater
than that of a more culpable, and more cunning, insider."17 More-
over, even if the ex ante risks of all insiders were equal, ex post
inequity still would result because equal treatment of persons who
are not in an equal position tends to be inequitable. As will be seen,
such problems are exacerbated when the pragmatic approach is
applied concurrently with the objective approach.
-The Pragmatic Approach
Allocational Effects
Because the objective and pragmatic approaches have many simi-
larities, this subsection will emphasize the ways in which the prag-
matic approach '18 alters the conclusions reached above.
The pragmatic approach was adopted to mitigate the inequalities
of the objective approach in cases involving unorthodox transac-
tions. The "possibility of abuse" test, with its subjective inquiry and
its detailed factual examination, has undermined the simple pro-
phylactic rule that Congress intended."' If the goal is to curb insider
short-swings at the lowest social cost, the pragmatic approach is not
the appropriate tool, for such a rule encourages litigation and subse-
quent appeals, while discouraging settlements. Such results, cou-
pled with the opportunity cost to the judicial system, " suggest that
116. Cf. J. PECHMAN, supra note 91, at 111-15. If "shifting" to the consumers is not possible,
the burden will fall instead on the shareholders and/or employees.
117. Holding constant the level of technology of detection and enforcement, the
further one moves along the spectrum in the direction of higher fines, but lower
risk of punishment . . . the greater will [be] the ex post inequity placed on
those who happen to get caught.
Pauly & Willett, supra note 85, at 15.
118. See notes 52-73 supra & accompanying text.
119. See Note, Securities Exchange Act of 1934-Partial Avoidance of Section 16(b)
Liability Through Use of Split Sale Device, 47 TUL. L. REv. 1191, 1197 (1973).
120. Like other resources, judicial and enforcement resources are scarce; as a result, an
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the pragmatic approach is contrary not only to the legislative his-
tory of section 16(b), but also to the social policy of conserving
resources. As Justice Douglas has noted: "Instead of a section that
is easy to administer and by its clearcut terms discourages litiga-
tion, we have instead a section that fosters litigation, because [the
pragmatic approach) holds out the hope for the insider that he may
avoid §16(b) liability."''
Not only are the costs in terms of judicial resources great, but also
such an ad hoc approach has adverse consequences on overall mar-
ket performance,"'2 as well as on the deterrent value of the section.
In considering an insider's decision-making process, it usually is
assumed that the two enforcement policy variables act indepen-
dently of each other. Under the present state of section 16(b) reme-
dies, however, this assumption is false. Because of the harsh calcu-
lation of "profits," the courts resorted to the pragmatic approach,
and by so doing, indirectly decreased the probability of holding the
insider liable.1' In fact, if such a harsh penalty deters more courts
from holding a defendant liable than deters insiders from speculat-
ing, it actually may increase the number of violations, especially if
the insiders are risk preferrers. In addition, the incentives to litigate,
as opposed to settling, provided to the insider create a concomitant
disincentive to the issuing corporation (and more importantly to the
shareholders thereof) to bring suit. Although possibly lessening the
risk of champerty, such a tendency results in an even greater de-
crease in the probability that insiders will be held liable.
Distributional Effects
The apparent interrelationship of the enforcement variables re-
allocation of such resources to resolve one conflict necessarily requires that resolution of other
conflicts must be deferred.
121. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. at 612 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
122. It has been observed that:
Where a regulation is uncertain in its application ... an investor may avoid an
investment on the erroneous assumption that the statute prohibits it. This is
an intrusion of noneconomic factors into the market situation, a theoretical cost,
without the corresponding benefit of deterring prohibited conduct. There is no
benefit because the investment that was "deterred" was not prohibited and
presumably not undesirable.
Pragmatic Approach, supra note 46, at 627 n.146.
123. An analogy to this concept is found in the area of criminal punishment. If penalties
are imposed which exceed that which society believes is appropriate, juries will be less
inclined to convict the defendants.
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sults in a direct relationship between equity and efficiency. As the
probability of holding inside traders liable decreases, overall effi-
ciency decreases and equity, both ex ante and ex post, tends to
decrease. From an ex ante view, the pragmatic approach arbitrarily
segregates section 16(b) suits according to the type of transaction
involved. The insider covered by the section because of a cash pur-
chase and sale faces a conclusive presumption, while the same insi-
der would have a greater "chance" if he happened to participate
in an unorthodox transaction such as a tender offer, or if he were
only a "titular director." Hence ex ante inequity results. As one
commentator has noted: "If the defendant is to be relieved of liabil-
ity because he could not have abused his insider status, he should
be relieved whether he has traded his securities for other securities
pursuant to a merger or simply sold them for cash."' 2' If the goal of
16(b) regulation is to achieve ex ante equity, an equal access to
information for all investors, it is inconsistent to make a factual
inquiry into the "possibility of abuse" in one type of transaction and
not in the other. Thus, the ex post inequity existing under the objec-
tive approach is exacerbated under the pragmatic approach, in that
even fewer insiders are required to disgorge their section 16(b) prof-
its.
The attempt of the courts, via the pragmatic approach, to con-
sider the substance of the transactions is commendable. Unfortun-
ately, however, because this inquiry is made only in a limited num-
ber of insider activities, the consequences tend to be what neither
Congress nor the courts intended. To be equitable, such an ap-
proach should be extended to include orthodox cash transactions as
well. Under its present status, therefore, section 16(b) has lost its
predictability and simplicity, yet has gained little in terms of eq-
uity.
RULE 10B-5: A MORE EQUITABLE ALTERNATIVE
Overview
Perhaps the most significant development in the field of securities
regulation has been the expansive application of rule 10b-5,'2 pro-
124. Pragmatic Approach, supra note 46, at 623.
125. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b.5 (1976):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
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mulgated pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act. '2 Adopted by the SEC in 1943, rule 10b-5 was written broadly,
possessing none of the inherent restrictions of section 16(b) other
than a fairly rigid standing requirement. 2 ' Congress intended sec-
tion 10(b) to serve as "a general prohibition of a relatively wide
variety of deceitful or manipulative practices ... both on and off
the exchanges."'28 Rule 10b-5 effects this aim by proscribing any
fraudulent conduct "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security." Such broad language permits flexible application so that
"loopholes" that might arise in other provisions may be closed."
Because the plaintiff must overcome several procedural and sub-
stantive obstacles to obtain relief under rule 10b-5, however, plain-
tiffs in effect are encouraged to pursue 16(b) relief with its liberal
standing and evidentiary standards. 3 '
Either the SEC or a private party may sue under rule 10b-5, 3 1 the
common-law privity requirement is abolished,' and the class of
defendants is not limited to insiders as defined in section 16(a). In
SEC suits for injunctive relief, the Commission normally names as
defendants any person or entity that was connected with the alleged
violation.' In private actions, the defendant need not be a pur-
chaser or seller of securities so long as his conduct is connected with
such a purchase or sale.'34 Thus, if one party to the transaction
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
127. See notes 142-51 infra & accompanying text.
128. W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING (1968), at 19.
129. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). For a concise history
of the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation, see K. PATRICK, PERPETUAL JEOPARDY (1972).
130. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); 6 L. Loss,
SECURIES REGULATION 3646-47 (Supp. 1969).
131. In 1947, a private right of action was inferred from the language of the rule. Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). It was not until 1971 that the
Supreme Court expressly affirmed this right. Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas.
Co., 409 U.S. 6 (1971). This conclusion is consistent with J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S.
426 (1964), holding private enforcement of the proxy regulations "provides a necessary sup-
plement to Commission action." Id. at 432.
132. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
133. See 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 108, § 9.19(1) at 9-53.
134. See, e.g., Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319
[Vol. 18:389
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 16(b)
occupies a fiduciary position to another, rule 10b-5 imposes on the
former an affirmative duty of disclosure of any material facts known
to him and unknown to the other party."5 Similarly, those who aid
in the breach of such a fiduciary duty are potential defendants both
in SEC 3' and in private suits.
"Tipping" is a major area in which rule 10b-5 is applied. The
basic principle of tippee liability is that a tippee, who is otherwise
an "outsider," becomes liable under rule 10b-5 when he purchases
or sells to another on the basis of inside information received from
an insider-tipper, without disclosing such information to the other
party. One court has held that tippees are liable to the same extent
as insiders. 37 The SEC has adopted a similar approach, 3 ' although
in many situations its available sanction is limited to censure.,
Effective application of 10b-5 to tipping, however, is hampered
by the difficulty of identifying the tippee and his source. Moreover,
the scope of liability remains unclear."' At least one court has held
that, to develop a strong deterrent to tipping, the best policy is to
place the liability on the tipper for his profits as well as for the
profits of his immediate tippees.'4'
Perhaps the most controversial issue under rule 10b-5 is the
plaintiff's standing to bring a private action. To have standing, the
plaintiff, unlike the defendant, must be a purchaser or a seller. As
such, this "Birnbaum doctrine"'' 2 precludes standing for persons
who merely refrained from purchasing or selling in reliance on the
fraud. Via the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, "13 the
F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963). "[A] corporation's misleading material statement may injure an
investor irrespective of whether the corporation itself, or those individuals managing it, are
contemporaneously buying or selling the stock of the corporation." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sul-
phur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 861 (2d Cir. 1968).
135. See Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969); In re
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
136. See SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1973).
137. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
138. In re Investors Management Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267
[1970.1971 Transfer binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,163 (July 29, 1971).
139. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(7) (1970). See also 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 108, §
9.20(7) at 9-68 to 9-70.
140. See Note, Deterrence of Tippee Trading Under Rule 10b-5, 38 U. Cmi. L. REv. 372
(1971).
141. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
142. The rule was first handed down in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461
(1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
143. ld. at 464.
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court in Birnbaum reasoned that because section 16(b) expressly
gives the shareholder a right of action, "[t]he absence of a similar
provision in section 10(b) strengthens the conclusion that that sec-
tion was directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudu-
lent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securi-
ties rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs
. . ,"I" Such an interpretation is not mandated by statutory lan-
guage, but rather by judicial policy."' The overriding concern of the
courts in sustaining this artificial rule is that otherwise there would
be a flood of litigation, especially nuisance litigation. "' In defense
of this policy, the courts contend that a person who refrains from
participating in a trade has the subsequent option of selling his
stock, "' or of bringing a common law action.' The Supreme Court
recently reaffirmed the Birnbaum doctrine in Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 49 despite criticism from both the SEC' and the
lower courts.'
144. Id. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See generally
Comment, Securities-Rule lOb-5-Supreme Court Reaffirms Birnbaum Doctrine, 44
FoRe, HAm L. REV. 452 (1975).
145. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748-49 (1975). See also
Comment, Securities Law-Fraud-Standing of Nonpurchasers and Nonsellers Under Sec-
tion 10(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 256, wherein the writer
rejects the Blue Chip Stamps rationale.
146. The very real risk in permitting those [who refrain from purchasing or selling)
to sue under Rule 10b-5 is that the door will be open to recovery of substantial
damages on the part of one who offers only his own testimony to prove that he
even consulted a prospectus of the issuer ....
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 746 (1975).
See also, McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961).
147. See Note, The Purchaser-Seller Limitation to SEC Rule 10b-5, 53 CORNELL L. REV.
684 (1968). Should the investor subsequently sell and incur a loss, his damages would be
partially mitigated by capital loss treatment on his tax return. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 1211, 1221. One commentator has suggested that such a loss be given more favorable
treatment under section 165 as a theft loss deduction. See Note, Extension of the Internal
Revenue Code Theft Loss Deduction to Victims of Securities Frauds, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 1388
(1975).
148. See note 4 supra.
149. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See notes 144-46 supra & accompanying text.
150. Prior to Blue Chip Stamps, the SEC had submitted amicus briefs in sever' cases
proposing a judicial relaxation of Birnbaum. See, e.g., Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell,
464 F.2d 339, 341 (9th Cir. 1972); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 332 (2d Cir. 1971).
151. See Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). (The court, per Judge, now Justice, Stevens repudiated
Birnbaum, arguing alternatively for a "nexus" approach). Some courts have found
"constructive" and "forced" purchases and sales. See, e.g., James v. Gerber Prod. Co., 483
F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973); Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972); Bailes v. Colonial
Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1971). See generally Note, Rule 10b-5: The Rejection of
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The materiality'52 of the misrepresentation or omission, and the
reliance'53 thereon are relatively straightforward elements of a rule
10b-5 action. Determining whether the defendant possessed a culpa-
ble state of mind, however, is problematic. The state of mind re-
quirement usually relates only to private suits for monetary recov-
ery; in suits for injunctive relief brought by either a private party
or the SEC, the defendant's state of mind is irrelevant.' Innocent
conduct' generally is not within the purview of the rule's applica-
tion, whereas, conversely, an intent to deceive' always falls within
its bounds. Between these two extremes lie "negligence"'' 7 and
"reckless disregard,"'' 5 two concepts of uncertain significance. Re-
cently, the Supreme Court endorsed the more frequent rule in the
circuit courts, 5 9 that mere negligence is insufficient to invoke rule
10b-5 liability.'
Upon determining that the above elements of material misrepre-
the Birnbaum Doctrine By Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. and the Need for a
New Limitation on Damages, 1974 DuKE L.J. 610.
152. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968): "In each case
* . .whether facts are material within Rule 10b-5 ... will depend at any given time upon a
balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated
magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity." Cf. TSC Industries,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 96 S.Ct. 2126 (1976) (an omitted fact is material under Rule 14a-9 if
substantial likelihood exists that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important); Mills
v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
153. Unlike the cases of affirmative misrepresentations and half-truths, in the case of non-
disclosure, "positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery." Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972).
154. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
155. See Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970) where it was stated:
One is not to be held liable ... because of his misleading misrepresentation or
omission of material fact, the truth of the matter being unknown to the pur-
chaser, if the party responsible for the misrepresentation or omission sustains
the burden of proving that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known that it was a misrepresentation or omission.
Id. at 357.
156. See 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 108, § 9.21(4)(b) at 9-91.
157. Negligent misrepresentation is present if "the defendant made the statement honestly
believing it to be true and believing that he had sufficient basis for such belief, but (1) without
having made an adequate investigation of its truth or (2) with no reasonable basis for believ-
ing the statement to be true ..... Id. at 9-91 to 9-92.
158. Reckless disregard is found either where "[the defendant made the statement not
knowing whether it was true or false," or he "made the statement honestly believing it was
true but knowing that he did not have sufficient basis for believing it to be true." Id. at 9-91.
159. Compare Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (proof of willful or
reckless disregard for the truth required), with Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579
(5th Cir. 1974) (a negligent standard of conduct sufficient for rule 10b-5 liability).
160. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976).
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sentation or omission, reliance, and culpable state of mind exist, the
court then must determine the appropriate measure of 10b-5 liabil-
ity. Although there is no black letter law of remedies under rule 10b-
5, the common denominators of 10b-5 remedies include a policy of
deterrence, a goal of making the plaintiff "whole," and a goal of
equal compensation to all equally harmed investors.'"' Neither puni-
tive damages, nor attorney's fee are awarded, but litigation costs are
allowed.
One ad hoc approach in determining the correct measure of liabil-
ity is to award rescissory damages"2 computed with reference, not
to the date of the transaction, but to some post-transaction date''
so that it is less likely that the defendant will be unjustly enriched.'"
Applying such a remedy in the absence of privity may well produce
substantial liability for the defendant, liability that far exceeds his
related benefits." 5 For this reason, the court in Mitchell v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co."I rejected this rule in favor of a "cover-type"
award.' Under this approach, the court concluded that damages
should be the difference between the highest price of the stock dur-
ing the nine days following the misrepresentation, and the selling
price of the shares. 66 Several other courts have adopted an "out-of-
pocket" measure of damages that represents "the difference be-
tween the contract price, or the price paid, and the real or actual
value at the date of the sale, together with such outlays as are
attributable to the defendant's conduct.""'6 At least one court has
suggested that as this theory, in which expectancy gains of the
161. See 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 108, § 9.22(1), at 9-111; R. FROME & V. ROSEN-
ZWEIG, SALES OF SECURITIES BY CORPORATE INSIDERS § 6.306 at 170 (2d ed. 1975).
162. Basically, this is the monetary value of what the defrauded seller would have received
had specific restitution been available, or, in other words, the difference between the value
of the consideration exchanged by the defrauded seller or buyer. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Sandia
Am. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 980 (E.D. Pa. 1969), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
452 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 938 (1971).
163. See Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded
Securities, 26 STAN. L. Rav. 371 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Measure of Damages].
164. Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965): "It
is more appropriate to give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls than to let the
fraudulent party keep them." Id. at 786.
165. See Measure of Damages, supra note 163, at 373-74.
166. 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1972).
167. Id. The court in Mitchell noted that "the measure of damages used should award the
reasonable investor the amount it would have taken him to invest in the TGS market within
a reasonable period of time after he became informed [of the true facts]." Id. at 105.
168. Id. at 105.
169. Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 303
F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962).
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plaintiff are irrelevant, is the most precise measure of damages in
open market transactions, it should provide the upper limit of liabil-
ity. 70
Allocational and Distributional Effects
In maximizing the efficient use of administrative and judicial
resources, rule 10b-5 presents greater difficulties than does section
16(b), because of both the different role played by the SEC and the
additional evidentiary hurdles. Unlike section 16(b), rule 10b-5 in-
creases administrative costs because it mandates that the Commis-
sion actively participate in bringing suit against violators. Also,
because of the complex factual issues in both private and SEC
actions, litigation costs are generally high, exceeding those resulting
from the application of the pragmatic approach under 16(b). More-
over, although application of the Birnbaum doctrine restricts
"nuisance" litigation under 10b-5,'71 it also precludes recovery for
many persons who have been injured."' To the extent this occurs, a
suboptimal supply of enforcers results. A more liberal standing rule
thus would be more efficient; for, as attorney fees generally are not
allowed under rule 10b-5,113 the risk of champerty still would be
negligible.
From the insider's perspective, the first enforcement variable, the
probability of holding inside traders liable, is affected, not only by
the quantity of potential plaintiffs and by the amount of SEC re-
sources available, but also by the substantive requirements of the
rule. Because rule 10b-5 is complicated substantively, the proba-
bility of finding a defendant liable is low although use of judicial
resources is extensive. Even though sections 14 and 16(a) are uti-
lized to detect fraudulent trading, detection is more difficult under
rule 10b-5, especially in the area of tipping. "A prohibition on tippee
170. See Measw'e of Damages, supra note 163, at 385. The author notes that "[tihe
economic reality of how much an investor actually suffers needs to be balanced against the
detrimental impact on corporate existence and on remaining, innocent shareholders. An
open-market trader should receive no more than his out-of-pocket loss." Id. at 396.
171. Notably, however, several members of the judiciary have indicated that the argu-
ment that a flood of litigation would result if the rule enunciated in Birnbaum were relaxed,
is specious. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (Black-
mun, Douglas & Brennan, J.J., dissenting); Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490
F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973) (Judge, now Justice, Stevens writing for the majority).
172. See generally Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule
lOb-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968).
173. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
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trading is difficult to enforce, for the universe of potential tippees
is virtually unlimited and detection is likely to occur only in the
most obvious of cases."'7 Apparently the "most obvious" tippee
suits are the ones in which the cost to the Commission or private
party is minimal. On a cost-benefit analysis, suit should be brought,
not merely in the easy cases (in which the SEC can inflate its re-
cord), but against both frequent. violators and the not-so-frequent
violators who cause extensive damage.'75 To the extent that such a
policy is not pursued, the probability of holding an insider liable is
decreased, so that even as to risk averse insiders, the deterrent value
of rule 10b-5 is minimized.
As for the second enforcement policy variable, the discounted
value of the sanction, the available empirical evidence apparently
supports the view that the liability imposed pursuant to rule 10b-5
is of limited deterrent value. Analyzing insider reactions to three
significant events in the evolution of the rule, In re Cady, Roberts
& Co., the Texas Gulf Sulphur indictment, and SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur, one commentator concluded that "[t]here appeared to be
few changes in the characteristics of trading."'' 8 Such evidence
nonetheless is hardly unequivocal.
If the requirement of privity is relaxed so that plaintiffs may sue
on open market transactions, the deterrent value of rule 10b-5 is
enhanced in that the potential recovery is increased. The same is
true if a tipper is held liable for profits made by all subsequent
tippees.'77 Yet, as noted above, the deterrent effect of rule 10b-5 is
questionable under its present application. As the stakes usually are
high the incentive to violate the law is great. Nevertheless, the
possibility exists that the psychic costs (non-monetary costs, e.g.,
social stigma) to the defendant act as some deterrence. Also, even
174. Note, Deterrence of Tippee Trading Under Rule lOb-5, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 372, 375
n.20 (1971).
175. See Stigler, supra note 75, at 533.
176. Jaffe, The Effect of Regulation Changes on Insider Trading, 5 BEL J. ECON., 93, 114
(1974). Jaffe also notes: "Only the Texas Gulf Sulphur decision seems to have had even a
slight effect on the profitability of insider trading .... Furthermore, the data do not suggest
that the regulatory changes affected the volume of insider trading. The volume actually
increased slightly after each of the three events. . . ." Id.
177. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005
(1971): "As to the requirement that [the tipper] make restitution for the profits derived by
his tippees, admittedly more of a hardship is imposed. However, without such a remedy,
insiders could easily evade their duty to refrain from trading on the basis of inside
information." Id. at 1308.
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though punitive damages are not allowed,' one court has chosen to
compute damages by a method analogous to that under section
16(b). 17 Likewise, injunctions obtained through SEC suits produce
an increase in the discounted value of the sanction.' One commen-
tator'8' has asserted, however, that injunctions obtained through the
process of consent decrees 8 ' have mitigated much of the harshness.
The disadvantages of the present application of rule 10b-5 in
terms of efficiency, are more than compensated for in terms of eq-
uity. Like section 16(b), the underlying premise of rule 10b-5 is ex
ante equality of access to information by all members of the invest-
ing public. Unlike section 16(b), however, rule 10b-5 is an equitable
means to an equitable end. In terms of culpability, greater ex ante
and ex post equity are generally achieved because the rule distin-
guishes between the innocent and the less-than-innocent. Thus, the
language of rule 10b-5 allows the result that the pragmatic approach
under 16(b) can attain only by twisting the plain language and the
legislative history of the section.
For example, because rule 10b-5 applies to every situation involv-
ing fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,"
everyone is similarly situated should they violate the rule. Admit-
tedly, to the extent that the probability of holding insiders liable is
reduced, causing more violators to escape liability, ex post inequity
will be the result. But because increasing this probability is costly,
such a trade-off may be necessary.8 3 In terms of equity, the major
weakness in rule 10b-5 is the uncertain method of measuring dam-
ages. Because ex post equity is achieved only when similarly situ-
ated defendants bear similar costs, one method of computing dam-
ages is required, so as to insure that damages are commensurate
with liability. Moreover, if the method used to detect, and ulti-
178. See, e.g., de Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970); Green v.
Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). Section 28 of the
Securities Exchange Act expressly limits recovery to "actual damages." 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a)
(1970).
179. SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974) (defendant made to disgorge his paper
profits computed by reference to the highest market value subsequent to the defendant's
purchase and prior to his sale).
180. Cf. Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1969). See note 81 supra.
181. Sargent, The SEC and the Individual Inuestor: Restoring His Confidence in the
,Market, 60 VA. L. REv. 553 (1974).
182. Id. at 578. Such decrees are used by the Commission both in the federal courts and
in administrative proceedings. In consenting, the defendants do not admit wrongdoing.
183. Pauley & Willett, supra note 85, at 15.
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mately to find liability, is random,14 ex ante equity still can be
attained. As this is the salient goal of the anti-fraud provisions, such
an approach is apparently appropriate.
CONCLUSION AND A PROPOSAL
The purpose of this Note has been to illustrate the inherent defi-
ciencies of both the objective and the pragmatic approaches to sec-
tion 16(b), while, at the same time, emphasizing the advantages of
rule 10b-5. The implications of the foregoing analysis suggest that
a rule of law of general application, such as rule 10b-5, tends to
achieve an optimal degree of both equity and efficiency. As a statute
becomes more specific in its application, efficiency and equity are
minimized. The constructions of Kern County, Reliance Electric
and Foremost-McKesson have steadily eroded section 16(b); the
applicability of rule 10b-5 has been increasingly expanded. 85
Ironically, section 16(b), a statute apparently premised on equita-
ble notions, has become generally inequitable in its application. The
ad hoc policymaking of the pragmatic approach has led to perplex-
ing consequences. Although most commentators think section 16(b)
continues to serve a necessary function,88 it appears that Congress
should reconsider the validity of this statute. Lowenfels contends
that "Congress has many more pressing and important problems
than the fate of one comparatively obscure provision of the federal
securities laws."'' 8 Yet the courts also have more pressing concerns
than struggling with the inconsistent decisions under 16(b). In
short, the pragmatic approach is no longer the solution to the harsh-
ness of section 16(b); rather, such an approach has itself created
serious confusion.
If Congress would consider the concurrent development of section
16(b) and rule 10b-5, it would be clear that the continued existence
of 16(b) is unjustified. Prior to Texas Gulf Sulphur, which repre-
sented the advent of rule 10b-5 as a useful tool in retarding insider
trading, the courts seemingly were justified in expanding the appli-
cation of section 16(b), even though such a policy affected transac-
184. Total randomness is virtually impossible; thus, some bias is inevitable.
185. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Superintend-
ent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); SEC v. National Securities,
Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
186. See, e.g., 2 L. Loss, SEcuRmEs REGULATON 1089 (2d ed. 1961); Lowenfels, supra note
31, at 64.
187. Lowenfels, supra note 31, at 64.
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tions not contemplated in the legislative history. The courts were
confronted with two undesirable choices: they could apply the
objective approach that Congress apparently intended, and reach
absurd results in unorthodox situations, or they could develop their
own approach and merely pay lip service to the intent of Congress.
Even given the rapid expansion of rule 10b-5, these same courts now
find the hands of equity bound by anachronistic precedents. 8 ,
Today the distinction between section 16(b) and rule 10b-5 has
been almost eliminated. Fortunately, even the courts have begun to
realize the obsolescence of section 16(b). The Supreme Court in
Foremost-McKesson noted, "Rule 10b-5 has been held to embrace
the evils that Foremost urges its [broad] construction of §16(b) is
necessary to prevent."'89 There is no reason why rule 10b-5 cannot
accomplish even more than section 16(b). The policies underlying
both are the same. Also, the pragmatic approach to section 16(b)
requires the same factual inquiries as does rule 10b-5.11° The only
difference is the degree of proof required to impose liability. The
pragmatic approach allows imposition of harsh liability on a show-
ing of a mere "possibility of abuse," a test that theoretically does
not require any showing of actual use of inside information. Rule
10b-5 requires a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
there was an actual abuse of inside information. 1' Although rule
10b-5 is procedurally more burdensome to the plaintiff, this burden
could be eased by evidentiary rules and presumptions without de-
creasing the equitable effects of the rule.
Even if section 16(b) were not redundant, however, it still should
be eliminated because of its gross inequity. Prior to Texas Gulf
Sulphur, one commentator proposed that section 16(b) be amended
to require a two-year focal period with merely a rebuttable presump-
tion of insider trading,'9 2 a then reasonable and workable suggestion.
In the aftermath of Texas Gulf Sulphur, however, such an amend-
188. See ALI FEDERAL SECUrrES CODE § 1413, Comment 1 at 133 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
189. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 96 S. Ct. 508, 521 n.29 (1976).
190. For the similarity of inquiry between the pragmatic approach and the approach of rule
10b-5, compare Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), with Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479
F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
191. See Objective Approach, supra note 37, at 928-29. See also Weinstock, Section 16(b)
and the Doctrine of Speculative Abuse: How to Succeed in Being Subjective Without Really
Trying, 29 Bus. LAWYER 1153, 1175-76 (1974) where the writer emphasizes that "the
distinction [between the factual inquiries of the pragmatic approach and of rule 10b-5 is]
more apparent than real ..
192. See Munter, supra note 92, at 89-101.
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ment seems inadvisable; repeal of section 16(b) by Congress is the
only appropriate course.
Rule 10b-5, however, requires modification, either by judicial in-
terpretation, administrative rule, or statutory amendment, to in-
crease its effectiveness. As noted, the deterrent value of the rule
must be increased without sacrificing its basic equitable nature. To
accomplish this, the Birnbaum doctrine should be abolished. Al-
though the probability of increasing nuisance litigation by relaxing
the standing requirement is merely speculative,'93 the benefits are
readily apparent.
The inflexibility of Birnbaum precludes regulatory adaptation to
the expanding variety of fraudulent securities transactions.'94 By
repudiating Birnbaum the probability of imposing liability on a
violator would increase because there would be more potential
plaintiffs who could negotiate successfully the substantive obstacles
of the rule. Similarly, the discounted value of the sanction would
be increased in that the defendant potentially would be liable to
more plaintiffs, although his expected gain would remain the same.
Thus, such action would increase the deterrent effect to both risk
averters and risk preferrers.
The equitable arguments in favor of a relaxed standing require-
ment are equally compelling. It is inequitable to preclude an inves-
tor from bringing suit merely because he did not purchase or sell his
shares. Certainly, that person still could be injured greatly by re-
fraining from such action in reliance on fraudulent conduct. From
an ex ante viewpoint the abolition of Birnbaum would increase
equity by equalizing the liability risks of a greater number of de-
frauders. Concomitantly, ex post equity would be increased because
all defendants would be subject to liability directly related to the
amount of damage caused, regardless of whether the injured party
relied by purchasing or selling, or by refraining from doing so.
193. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Justice Blackmun
dissenting noted:
[T]he Court, in my opinion, unfortunately mires itself in speculation and con-
jecture not usually seen in its opinions....
Certainly, this Court must be aware of the realities of life, but it is unwar-
ranted for the Court to take a form of attenuated judicial notice of the motiva.
tions that defense counsel may have in settling a case, or of the difficulties that
a plaintiff may have in proving his claim.
Id. at 769-70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
194. Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5, 54 VA.
L. RFv. 268, 275 (1968).
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Theoretically, courts could achieve similar results without an
express rejection of Birnbaum merely by reading "purchase" and
"sale" expansively. As Justice Blackmun argued in Blue Chip
Stamps, "the word 'sale' ordinarily and naturally may be under-
stood to mean not only a single, individualized act ... but also the
generalized event of public disposal of property through advertise-
ment, auction, or some other market mechanism.1 1' 5 In view of pos-
sible problems resulting from an artificially expansive reading, how-
ever, express judicial rejection of Birnbaum is the better approach.
Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.'8 evinces a significant
recent departure from Birnbaum. There the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit applied a "nexus rule" so that any investor, regard-
less of whether he purchased or sold, who has suffered significant
injury as a direct result of fraudulent conduct has standing. Dissent-
ing in Blue Chip Stamps, Justice Blackmun argued that under this
approach, "Isjensible standards of proof and of demonstrable
damages would evolve and serve to protect the worthy and shut out
the frivolous.' 97
Remedies is the other area of rule 10b-5 that needs modification.
That similarly situated defendants will incur the same liability
should be the overriding objective in the application of rule 10b-5.
Because increasing the discounted value of the sanction is virtually
costless, and in the case of rule 10b-5 would involve no trade-off in
terms of equity, a policy of allowing merely out-of-pocket damages
should be rejected. Moreover, punitive damages should be permit-
ted in appropriate cases. To be an effective deterrent, a remedy
must do more than require the wrongful party to return what he has
gained. Even if liability were certain, there is no deterrent effect in
the policy of allowing out-of-pocket damages, except possible social
stigma and the opportunity cost.
Admittedly, the regulation of insider trading is still necessary, 9 '
195. 421 U.S. at 764 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
196. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
197. 421 U.S. at 771 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
198. See Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 435 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting), citing Baumhart, How EthicalAre Businessmen?, 36 HAnv. Bus. REv. July-Aug.,
1961, at 6:
ITihe modern-day insider is no less prone than his counterpart of a generation
ago to succumb to the lure of insider trading where windfall profits are in the
offing. Indeed, in a survey of "reputable" businessmen, 42% of those responding
indicated they would themselves trade on inside information, and 61% believed
that the "average" executive would do likewise.
Id. But cf. Friedman, The Uses of Corruption, NEWSWEEK, March 22, 1976, at 73.
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for if ex ante equality of access to information exists, the investing
public is likely to accept any resulting ex post inequality in income
derived from such information. The appropriate means to achieve
this valid end, however, lies not in a 16(b) type statute that merely
decreases confidence in the market and maximizes investor cyni-
cism, but in rule lOb-5 and its future evolution.
